Lack of proportionality. Seven specifications of public interest that override post-approval commercial interests on limited access to clinical data by Strech, Daniel & Littmann, Jasper
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2012
Lack of proportionality. Seven specifications of public interest that override
post-approval commercial interests on limited access to clinical data
Strech, Daniel; Littmann, Jasper
Abstract: For the protection of commercial interests, licensing bodies such as the EMA and health tech-
nology assessment institutions such as NICE restrict full access to unpublished evidence. Their respective
policies on data transparency, however, lack a systematic account of (1) what kinds of commercial inter-
ests remain relevant after market approval has been granted, (2) what the specific types of public interest
are that may override these commercial interests post approval, and, most importantly, (3) what crite-
ria guide the trade-off between public interest and legitimate measures for the protection of commercial
interest. Comparing potential commercial interests with seven specifications of relevant public interest
reveals the lack of proportionality inherent in the current practices of EMA and NICE.
DOI: 10.1186/1745-6215-13-100
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: http://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-71751
Published Version
 
 
Originally published at:
Strech, Daniel; Littmann, Jasper (2012). Lack of proportionality. Seven specifications of public interest
that override post-approval commercial interests on limited access to clinical data. Trials, 13:100. DOI:
10.1186/1745-6215-13-100
COMMENTARY Open Access
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public interest that override post-approval
commercial interests on limited access to
clinical data
Daniel Strech1,2* and Jasper Littmann3
Abstract
For the protection of commercial interests, licensing bodies such as the EMA and health technology assessment
institutions such as NICE restrict full access to unpublished evidence. Their respective policies on data transparency,
however, lack a systematic account of (1) what kinds of commercial interests remain relevant after market approval
has been granted, (2) what the specific types of public interest are that may override these commercial interests
post approval, and, most importantly, (3) what criteria guide the trade-off between public interest and legitimate
measures for the protection of commercial interest. Comparing potential commercial interests with seven
specifications of relevant public interest reveals the lack of proportionality inherent in the current practices of EMA
and NICE.
Background
Several strategies have been discussed and recom-
mended to avoid or at least decrease the extent of bias
in published data [1,2], e.g., a requirement to register
studies, greater readiness of academic journals to accept
articles that publish negative findings, or commitments
of pharmaceutical manufacturers to fully publish all
available data. These strategies have not been sufficiently
effective. It is well established and has been demon-
strated in several recent cases that the publication of
clinical trials is often incomplete and that there is an ob-
servable bias towards publishing those results that are
favourable to a manufacturer of new drugs or medical
devices [3-5]. It is also well known, however, that licens-
ing bodies such as the FDA and EMA, which grant mar-
ket approval for new pharmaceutical products, have
access to all unpublished trial data (at least all those that
were required to grant market approval) [3,6,7]. Despite
repeated calls for more transparency on trial data, the
data held by the EMA, for example, are not available for
the public. This is also true for national health technol-
ogy assessment (HTA) institutions such as England's
NICE that provide (cost-) effectiveness analyses for reim-
bursement decisions and will often negotiate the
provision of unpublished data with pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers on conditions of confidentiality [8]. The main
reasons given by the respective agencies and outlined in
the corresponding policy documents to agree to condi-
tions of confidentiality are the protection of the com-
mercial interests of the pharmaceutical or medical
device industry (commercial-in-confidence regulations)
and the protection of personal data (patient confidenti-
ality) [7-9]. However, the same policy documents also
cite a limitation to the protection of commercial inter-
ests, namely in cases where commercial interests them-
selves (or measures for the protection of commercial
interests) infringe upon wider public interests. The EMA,
for example, specifies, “active publication or disclosure
upon request for access to documents can be done
when an overriding public interest in disclosure can be
identified” [7].
Despite their acknowledgement that commercial-in-
confidence regulation might affect public interests, policy
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documents of medical licensing bodies and HTA com-
mittees such as EMA or NICE currently fail to specify:
(1)What measures for the protection of commercial
interest remain available to manufacturers after
market approval has been granted;
(2)Which types of public interests ought to be
considered in evaluating the appropriateness of any
measure designed to protect commercial interests
post approval; and most importantly,
(3)What criteria guide the trade-off between public
interest and legitimate measures for the protection
of commercial interests.
This article briefly outlines the different definitions of
commercial interests in the policies of EMA and NICE,
with reference to a recent case analysis that described
the attempt to access a specific set of (unpublished) clin-
ical data from the EMA [6]. This article then specifies
for seven stakeholder groups the public interest in full
access to all trial data of pharmaceuticals and medical
devices. Finally, the article argues that in light of the
seven specifications of public interest in trial data access,
there is a disproportionate focus on those measures that
protect commercial interests (such as restricted access
to trial data) inherent in current data protection policies.
What the article does not provide is a detailed guide
to the multitude of respective policies that national and
international agencies have drawn up with regard to trial
data publication and protection of commercial interests,
as such an analysis would certainly extend beyond the
scope of one article. Furthermore, the article will not
discuss the various reasons and past developments that
underlie the current extent of secrecy in transparency
policies of EMA and NICE (see e.g. [10,11]). We also re-
frain from seeking to evaluate which actor within the
European health care sector would be most suitable to
address any shortcomings that we outline, and we recog-
nise that organisations like EMA are bound by European
law, and their activities are regulated not by health pol-
icies, but complex European trade and commerce
agreements.
Definitions and specifications of commercial interests
It is noteworthy that despite broadly similar formu-
lations of principles of confidentiality throughout the
process of drug approval within the European Union,
there is no definition that has been universally adopted
by all member states. The EMA has therefore proposed
that given the lack of such a common definition, com-
mercial confidential information “shall mean any infor-
mation which is not in the public domain or publicly
available and where disclosure may undermine the eco-
nomic interest of competitive position of the owner of
the information” [7]. And NICE states that “[commer-
cial] in confidence material [is] defined as confidential
because its public disclosure could have an impact on
the commercial interests of a particular company” [8].
Since the 1990s, different attempts have been made to
encourage drug regulation agencies to decrease the ex-
tent of secrecy on unpublished clinical trial data [10,12].
While some reviews demonstrated that unpublished
trials from drug-licensing applications added only a little
to the data available from published trials [13], others
showed how public disclosure of unpublished study
results was critical to uncovering the evidence of harm
[14] or the lack of effectiveness [15,16].
In a recent article, Gøtzsche and Jørgensen have
chronicled the process of gaining access to unpublished
trial data of two anti-obesity drugs from the EMA [6].
Their account gives two reasons provided by EMA for
limiting access to trial data (as a measure to protect
commercial interests): Unpublished trials held by the
EMA may contain commercially sensitive information
regarding (1) the clinical development programme of a
new product, and (2) the most substantial part of the
applicant's investment. The EMA argued that both types
of information could be used by competitors to their
economic advantage and that consequently, manufac-
turers applying for market approval had a vested (and
justified) interest in their protection. In this case, no fur-
ther commercial interests were alluded to. Whilst re-
searching this article, we contacted the information
services of three international organisations representing
the research-based pharmaceutical industry to inquire if
there were further reasons or relevant information to be
considered beside those mentioned by the EMA, which
would justify a restriction of access to data after market
approval has been granted.a After 4 weeks and a second
inquiry, only one (the German Association of Research-
Based Pharmaceutical Companies) responded and sent a
recent law analysis paper on European licensing pro-
cess. However, in this German language paper we did
not find further reasons or information that justify a
restriction of access to data after market approval has
been granted [17].
Gøtzsche's and Jørgensen's account is interesting for
another reason, as throughout the process of trying to
gain access to trial data, neither the EMA (who for more
than 2 years denied access) nor the European ombuds-
man who was involved as a mediator specifically ad-
dressed the question of potential overriding public
interests that might be present in this case. In his assess-
ment, the European ombudsman did not take a defini-
tive stance on whether public interests were affected in
this case, and restricted himself to pointing out that he
was unable to see any commercial interest being under-
mined 'specifically and actually' by providing access to
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the relevant reports and protocols at the EMA [6]. This
line of argument avoids a discussion of any potential
public interests that might be affected. However, in order
to assess the ethical justifiability of restriction of access
to trial data more generally, it appears important to be
more explicit about what types of public interest and
their specifications are potentially at stake.
Seven specifications of the public interest in full access to
trial data
Decisions in clinical research, medical training, clinical
care, public health, and health policy are all dependent
on comprehensive and unbiased information on the po-
tential benefits and harms of specific clinical or public
health interventions. A major source of biased informa-
tion on clinical or public health interventions is the
restricted access to all existing data from clinical re-
search. Biased information consequently leads to biased
decisions that may violate the core principles of medical
ethics; namely: beneficence, non-maleficence, respect of
patient autonomy, and justice [18]. How these ethical
principles are potentially violated will be explained in
the following paragraphs, which specify the public inter-
est in full access to trial data for seven different stake-
holder groups. While the focus of this article is on the
access to trial data after market approval has been
granted, some of the seven stakeholder groups (e.g. re-
search participants, clinical researchers, and research
ethics committees) also have a strong interest in access
to trial data before market approval has been granted
(for reasons described below).
Research participants arguably have a strong interest
in the release and public availability of the findings of
any study in which they took part [19]. Participating in
clinical trials carries health risks, which in spite of com-
pensation can only be deemed ethically acceptable under
certain conditions [20,21]. Paramount to these condi-
tions is the generation of expected social benefits or
value of such research. However, a biased publication of
trial data, or a complete withholding thereof, appears to
violate this basic principle. It should also be noted that it
is questionable whether patients would actually continue
to participate in research projects that carry certain risks
when they are adequately informed that research find-
ings that are helpful to inform health related decisions
may be withheld because of commercial interests, even
after market approval has been granted. To what extent
this interest of research participants justifies unrestricted
access to trial data must be judged with respect to the
interests of the following stakeholders.
Clinical researchers planning new trials need data
from earlier studies to formulate a sound research ques-
tion, refine measurement instruments, and calculate ad-
equate sample sizes [22]. Giving researchers access to all
available data, thereby allowing them to specify research
questions and to improve study designs, reduces the
burden imposed upon study participants [23].
Research ethics committees (REC) and institutional re-
view boards (IRB) have an interest in complete availabil-
ity of trial data in order to determine the feasibility and
all potential risks of clinical trials [23]. If the results of
previous research projects are only partially or not at all
available, this assessment of potential risks of new trials
is potentially compromised, which in turn may put fu-
ture trial participants at risk.
Clinical practice guideline (CPG) development panels
and health technology assessment (HTA) institutions can
judge best practice and develop reports and guidelines
for treatment only based on publicly available informa-
tion. Bias in published studies could potentially impact
on assessments and thus on the actual guidelines that
are being recommended [24]. A recent example is the
case described by IQWiG, the German HTA institution,
that uncovered unpublished trials that eventually led to
a substantial revision of the risk-benefit assessment of
the antidepressant reboxetin [5].
Patients and their doctors also draw on the infor-
mation and recommendations from clinical practice
guidelines and HTA reports during the process of
shared clinical decision making. Biases in these guide-
lines and reports thus impact on the optimal, persona-
lised course of treatment, and patients may be harmed
unnecessarily [25].
Public research sponsors such as the British Wellcome
Trust or the American National Institutes of Health
(NIH) will want to know what the risks and expected
benefits of a proposed project are, and what the added
benefit of a study is. However, if previous unpublished
research renders the proposed project redundant or of
minor practical relevance, scarce public resources will be
used inefficiently [26].
Health insurance companies (both statutory and pri-
vate) heavily draw on the final reports of HTA and CPG
groups when making coverage decisions. Biases in these
reports thus impact on the sound and fair allocation of
scarce financial resources [27].
Discussion and conclusion
In order to comprehensively assess the impact of re-
stricting access to trial data, and to reach ethically de-
fensible decisions, it is crucial to take into account the
seven specifications of public interest we have outlined
above. Currently, this does not appear to be common
practice: In the case recently described by Gøtzsche and
Jørgensen, the EMA argued that it could not identify
any overriding public interest in this particular case [6].
From an ethical perspective, however, it would have been
useful (and appropriate) if EMA had argued why different
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public interests such as those outlined above did not
affect the decision about data access in this specific case.
We would suggest that the tendency of medical licens-
ing bodies to place the protection of commercial interest
over the public interest in access to trial data lacks pro-
portionality. This is particularly obvious in cases where
restrictions to data access are upheld after a drug has
already been approved and entered the market.
Of course, there might be strong commercial interest
after market approval to withhold study findings that in-
dicate (1) that the effects of specific drugs or medical
devices are less positive and of lower clinical relevance
than suggested by the published data, or (2) that the side
effects are more severe and of greater clinical relevance
than suggested by the published data. However, protect-
ing commercial interests on these grounds does not ap-
pear to be justifiable on any ethical, practical or legal
grounds. This leads to the conclusion that unless (1)
there are other more legitimate reasons for continued
restriction of access to trial data post market approval of
a drug that have so far not been publicly discussed or (2)
there are exceptional circumstances in which the public
interest in trial data publication is negligible, the seven
types of public interests discussed offer a rationale for a
principle of full public disclosure of all trial data at the
same time as market approval has been granted.
Licensing bodies such as the EMA as well as HTA
institutions such as NICE should therefore provide fur-
ther justification as to why commercial interests fre-
quently override public interests in decisions to restrict
data access. As argued above, the current decision-
making practices of the EMA and NICE fail to account
for different specifications of public interest. From an
ethical perspective, it would therefore be appropriate for
the EMA and NICE to revise their policies on data
transparency: the default restriction to data should be
changed to a default access to data. This also applies to
other national institutions with similar transparency pol-
icies. Furthermore, the revised policies should specify (1)
the reasons for protecting commercially sensitive trial
data (before and after market access has been granted or
denied) and (2) when these reasons override the seven
specifications of public interest in informed decisions.
Endnotes
aThe organisations contacted were: The International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Asso-
ciations (IFPMA), the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), and the German
Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Compan-
ies (vfa).
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